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POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY AND 
CAPRICIOUSLY IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DECEDENT HAD NO 
PREEXISTING CONDITION. 
It is Appellant Workers1 Compensation Fund of Utah's position 
that the Industrial Commission of Utah acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in concluding that Mr. Dale Steward had no 
preexisting condition predisposing him to heart failure. That is, 
it is the Fund's contention that evidence in the record clearly 
indicates that Mr. Steward had a preexisting condition which 
substantially increased his risk of sustaining a heart attack. 
At page 8 of Respondent's Brief, it is set forth that the 
decedent had no pre-existing heart condition or other preexisting 
conditions and therefore the "any exertion" standard of Allen may 
be used to establish legal causation. 
[T]he Administrative Law Judge in this matter found that 
the decedent, Dale Steward, had no "previously diagnosed 
heart condition." This finding is not controverted in 
any of the evidence before the Commission. The Fund 
refers to various "risk" factors but the fact remains 
that Mr. Steward had never previously been diagnosed as 
having heart problems and no medical examination before 
or after his death indicated the presence of preexisting 
heart disease. 
While Respondent relies heavily upon the fact that Mr. 
Steward was never previously diagnosed as having heart problems, 
this is not fatal to Appellant's claim that there was a 
preexisting condition. As set forth in Appellant's principal 
brief, the preexisting condition of which Allen speaks need not be 
patent nor "previously diagnosed." See Justice Zimmerman's 
concurring opinion in Holloway v. Industrial Commission# 729 P.2d 
31, 32 (Utah 1986) wherein it is stated: 
With respect to the focus of this case on remand-whether 
Holloway had a preexisting condition-I would observe 
that the preexisting condition of which Allen speaks 
need not be patent; in fact, it need not have been known 
or knowable to anyone before the injury. The sole 
question is whether the worker came to the work place 
with a condition that increased his risk of injury. If 
he did and that condition contributed to the injury, 
then Allen's higher standard of legal causation comes 
into play so as to place that worker on the same footing 
as one who did not come to work with a preexisting 
condition, (emphasis added) 
It is Appellant Fund's contention that the record clearly 
indicates that Mr. Steward did in fact have a preexisting 
condition which increased his risk of injury. 
As indicated in Appellant's principal brief, on November 18, 
1985, Dr. Peter Heilbrun set forth, "In retrospect, it makes me 
wonder if some of [Dale Steward's] recent neck and shoulder pain 
was possibly myocardial in origin." (Appellants Principal Brief; 
R.135) 
Respondent maintains that this statement by Dr. Heilbrun 
"appears to have been simply a question, [and that] other 
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evidence from Dr. Heilbrun adequately supports the finding of the 
Administrative Law Judge." (Respondent's Brief page 8) 
Respondent Steward then cites a letter written by Dr. Heilbrun, 
dated July 25, 1986 wherein it is stated that "[Mr. Steward] had 
no prior history of cardiac disease, thus his death should be 
considered to be an industrial-related [sic] cardiac event." 
(Respondent's Brief page 9) 
It is the Fund's belief that Dr. Heilbrun1s statement amounts 
to much more than "simply a question." Rather, it rises to the 
level of being a calculated opinion that very possibly Mr. Steward 
had a preexisting heart condition. Further, inasmuch as this 
opinion was iterated within one week of decedent's death, it 
appears to be much more credible than the July 25, 1986 statement 
of Dr. Heilbrun. This is especially so in light of the fact that 
the July 25, 1986 letter appears to be a statement prepared at the 
widow's request and suggestion. In this light, Dr. Heilbrun wrote 
yet another letter to the claimant on the same date, July 25, 
1986, and stated: 
I am enclosing the following letter. Please read 
through it and advise me if you feel it satisfactorily 
explains my thoughts on the industrially related nature 
of Dale's heart attack. (R.244) 
Dr. Heilbrun's statement of November 18, 1985, taken in 
conjunction with the risk factors possessed by the decedent as 
discussed in Appellants principal brief at page 8 (36 year 
cigarette smoking habit, amphetamine use, emphysema, obesity), as 
well as Dr. Perry's statement, clearly show that the decedent had 
a preexisting heart condition which substantially increased his 
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risk of injury. Dr. Perry set forth: 
In terms of medical probability it is most likely that 
[Dale Steward] experienced a fatal cardiac arrhythmia 
while driving, lost consciousness a few seconds later 
thus losing control of the vehicle and having the 
accident as reported. It is possible that his 
dextroamphetamine was related to his death because it 
may worsen arrhythmias in susceptible [sic] individuals. 
(R.lll) 
Regarding this statement by Dr. Perry, Respondent Steward 
states that "Dr. Perry made no other conclusion with regard to 
preexisting heart disease in Mr. Steward and there was thus no 
substantial medical evidence before the Administrative Law Judge 
to indicate that Mr. Steward had any heart condition." 
(Respondent's Brief page 10) 
It is the Fund's position that Dr. Perryfs statement is 
tantamount to substantial medical evidence of a preexisting 
condition. Specifically/ Dr. Perry has impliedly stated that Mr. 
Steward had a preexisting heart condition. This is evidenced by 
Dr. Perry referring to Mr. Steward as being a "susceptible 
individual." Appellant posits that Mr. Steward was susceptible 
because he had a preexisting heart condition. 
Accordingly/ inasmuch as there is a lack of substantial 
evidence in the record to support a finding that Mr. Steward had 
no preexisting heart condition/ this finding must be reversed to 
properly reflect the evidence in the record indicating the 
presence of a preexisting condition. 
Further/ inasmuch as Mr. Steward had a history of amphetamine 
treatment for narcolepsy/ this also was a "...preexisting 
condition that increased his risk of injury." Hollowav/ supra. 
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Thus, because a preexisting condition was brought to the workplace 
by Mr. Steward, the unusual exertion standard of Allen should be 
applied* 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY AND 
CAPRICIOUSLY IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DECEDENT STEWARD 
EXPERIENCED UNUSUAL EXERTION. 
In support of her contention that Mr. Steward experienced 
unusual exertion while undertaking his employment duties, 
Respondent states that "the facts in this proceeding establish 
that Mr. Steward experienced exertion greater than that undertaken 
in normal everyday life..." (Respondent's Brief at 12) 
The Commission found that the Administrative Law Judge was 
justified in finding that the decedent was driving under unusually 
stressful circumstances due to the fact his departure was delayed, 
he had to drive on snow covered roads, and he had little or no 
rest in between the trip to Denver and the return trip to Salt 
Lake City. (R.287) 
As set forth in Appellant's principal brief, it is the Fund's 
belief that these aforementioned industrial factors do not amount 
to an exertion greater than that put forth in non-employment life. 
Moreover, it is Appellants position that the industrial factors 
certainly did not "contribute something substantial" to the risk 
already faced, and therefore per Allen, legal causation is 
lacking. From a purely logical standpoint, where there are other 
risk factors present (36 years of smoking, 1 1/2 packs of 
cigarettes a day, amphetamine use, emphysema, obesity), even in 
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the absence of the work stress factor, it would seem that adding 
one more factor (fatigue) is not a substantial contribution so as 
to conclude that the work activities caused the injury. Because 
the facts do not support a finding of unusual exertion, the 
finding of legal causation can not stand. 
POINT III 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY AND 
CAPRICIOUSLY IN CONCLUDING THAT MEDICAL CAUSATION WAS 
ESTABLISHED AND BY NOT SUBMITTING THE MEDICAL CAUSATION 
ISSUE TO A MEDICAL PANEL. 
While it is true, as stated by Respondent at page 14 of her 
Brief, that Respondent has established that Mr. Steward was 
fatigued immediately prior to suffering his fatal heart attack, 
this does not amount to a showing of medical causation. 
Respondent states that "It is significant that the Fund's 
physician, Dr. Perry, apparently was not presented with 
information about the stress and fatigue factors, since nowhere in 
his letter does he mention Mr. Steward's schedule, his lack of 
sleep, or the effects on him of the adverse weather conditions he 
experienced while driving to Denver." (Respondents Brief page 14) 
Appellcmt believes that this conclusory statement by 
Respondent is overly presumptuous. That is to say, just because 
Dr. Perry did not refer to certain factors certainly does not mean 
that the factors were not considered. Rather, it merely indicates 
that Dr. Perry did not believe that industrial stress factors - if 
any - played a part in causing Steward's death. Moreover, perhaps 
the reason for Dr. Perry not referring to any adverse weather is 
because the police report indicated that the road was dry and 
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there were no adverse weather conditions. (R.99,100) 
Further, in concluding that Stewardfs death was caused by the 
stress conditions surrounding his workplace, the Administrative 
Law Judge took judicial notice of a chart allegedly constituting 
"consensus medical opinion that stress, fatigue and stimulants are 
all common precipitating causes of cardiac arrhythmia." (R.287) 
While Appellants have contended in their principal brief that 
it was error for the Administrative Law Judge to take judicial 
notice of the chart to establish medical causation, Respondent 
maintain's that Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence permits her 
to do so. 
Specificallyf Respondent sets forth as follows: 
Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that a 
court may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts 
"capable of accurate and ready determination by resort 
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned." (Rule 201)(b)(2) 
* * * 
Although Rule 201 provides a mechanism for the Fund to 
be heard with regard to the Administrative Law Judge's 
taking of judicial noticef the Fund made no request to 
be heard and should not be allowed to complain at this 
stage of the proceedings that it could not. object to the 
material. 
(Respondent's Brief at page 15-16) 
It is the Fund's position that Rule 201 does not encompass 
taking judicial notice of the chart referred to by the 
Administrative Law Judge. In the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order, Judge Sumsion stated, "The Administrative Law Judge 
has not made any extensive research of medical literature relative 
to the causes of cardiac arrhythmias. He has reviewed, however, a 
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commentary on cardiac arrythmia's...n (R.272) The commentary 
reviewed by the Judge has a copyright date of 1968. 
The Fund believes that the twenty year old commentary on 
cardiac arrythmia's is a source whose accuracy can reasonably be 
questioned, and therefore, the chart does not fall within the 
ambit of Rule 201. 
Further, Respondents argument that the Fund should be 
precluded from objecting to the chart at this late stage of the 
proceedings is misplaced. 
The Fund first received notice of Judge Sumsion's reliance on 
the chart in his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
which was entered on May 28, 1987. 
On June 12, 1987, at its first opportunity, the Fund, in its 
Motion for Review, alleged error on the part of Judge Sumsion for 
taking judicial notice of the chart. 
In further support of its position that judicial notice was 
properly taken, Respondent cites the 1921 Utah case of North Beck 
Mining Company v. Industrial Commission of Utah* 58 Utah 486, 200 
P.Ill (1921). 
North Beck Mining is clearly distinguishable from the case at 
bar. While the situation at hand involves an internal failure 
injury and the highly technical issue concerning the medical cause 
of the internal failure, North Beck was concerned with the degree 
of impairment of an employee who had lost use of his hand. While 
medical expertise is required to determine the medical cause of an 
internal injury, no such expertise is required to take notice that 
8 
a miner who has lost use of his hand has incurred a substantial 
impairment. 
Respondent further states that "[e]ven if this court 
disregarded Dr. Heilbrun's opinion and determined that the 
Administrative Law Judge improperly took judicial notice of the 
reference material, Mrs. Steward has provided sufficient evidence 
to establish medical causation." (Respondents Brief at page 19) 
Respondent makes this statement and is then silent as to what 
other sufficient evidence has been provided to establish medical 
causation. Appellant is aware of no such evidence. 
Respondent further relies upon the Colorado case of 
Industrial Commission v. Havens
 f 314 P.2d 698 (1957). Havens is 
distinguishable from the case at bar inasmuch as there was very 
strong circumstantial evidence indicating a causal relationship 
between the injury to Havens and his work. 
Inasmuch as Mr. Steward had a preexisting condition as well 
as other risk factors, no such circumstantial evidence is present 
in this matter. Moreover, in Havens the facts were completely 
undisputed whereas in the present situation, there are factual 
disputes such as the weather conditions in which the decedent was 
driving. The Fund believes that the Colorado case of Industrial 
Commission v. Hesler, 370 P.2d 428 (Colo. 1962) is more 
representative of the case at bar than is Havens. In Heslej, the 
court set forth as follows: 
[1] In fatal "heart" cases the claimant must show that 
an accident or overexertion proximately caused the death 
of the employee. In the instant case the record fails 
to disclose an accident in the "slip and fall" sense of 
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that word/ and for that reason alone is distinguishable 
from Industrial Commission of Colorado v. Havens, 136 
Colo. lllr 314 P.2d 698/ where deceased suffered a blow 
from a handcar/ and Marotte v. State Compensation 
Insurance Fund/ 145 Colo, 99r357 P.2d 915f where the 
employee suffered a non-fatal heart attack shortly after 
an automobile accident. Being unable to show any such 
"accident"/ it devolved upon this claimant to establish 
overexertion. 
370 P.2d at 431 
Finally/ the Fund is of the firm belief that error was 
committed by not referring the medical causation issue to a 
medical panel. While Section 35-1-77/ Utah Cod Annotated (1953/ 
as amended) contains discretionary language allowing the 
Commission to refer matters to a medical panel/ Respondents 
believe/ as set forth in its principal brief/ that this discretion 
was abused. Moreover/ the Industrial Commission's own Rules and 
Regulations indicate that the medical causation issue must be 
referred to a medical pane. Workers Compensation Rule 1.2.33 sets 
forth/ in part/ as follows: 
1.2.33 GUIDELINES FOR UTILIZATION OF MEDICAL PANEL 
(a) A panel will be utilized where: 
2. In the opinion of the Commission the 
medical issues are so intertwined 
with the events that a 
determination of whether an accident 
has occurred cannot be made without 
first resolving medical 
consideration, (emphasis added) 
Inasmuch as the medical issue of causation herein is closely 
tied to the events surrounding the injury/death/ it is necessary 
that the issue by submitted to a medical panel. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because the findings of the Industrial Commission are not 
supported by the record/ the findings are arbitrary and 
capricious, and the Order of the Industrial Commission must be 
overturned and compensation benefits denied. In the alternative/ 
the issue of medical causation should be submitted to a medical 
panel. 
DATED this* day of April, 1988. 
James R. Black 
Kpvijh M. McDonough 
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